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FAMILY LAW

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN DENIAL OF EQUAL RECOVERY RIGHTS TO DEPENDENT UNACKNOWLEDGED ILLEGITIMATES
UNDER STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTE VIOLATES EQUAL
PROTECTION.

Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (U.S. 1972)
On June 22, 1967, Henry Clyde Stokes died of injuries sustained
during the course of his employment in Louisiana. Residing with him
at the time of his death were four dependent legitimate children' and one
dependent unacknowledged 2 illegitimate child. A second illegitimate child
3
was born posthumously.
Pursuant to the Louisiana workmen's compensation law,4 the four
legitimate children filed a claim for compensation for their father's death,
and the defendant employer impleaded the mother of the illegitimate children
who appeared claiming compensation on their behalf. The four legitimate
children brought a second suit against a third party tort-feasor to recover
losses sustained due to their father's death. The latter suit resulted in a
settlement, limited to the four legitimate children, which exceeded the
benefits allowable under the workmen's compensation statute. 5 In the
initial action the four legitimate children were awarded the maximum
statutory compensation which the trial judge declared satisfied by virtue of
the tort suit settlement.6 The two unacknowledged illegitimate children were
1. These children were born of the deceased's marriage to Adelaid Jones Stokes
who was at the time of her husband's death committed to a mental hospital. Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972).
2. An illegitimate child may be acknowledged by his father and mother or either
of them by means of a declaration to that effect before a notary public and two witnesses. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 203 (West 1952). Such an acknowledgment cannot
be made, however, in favor of children whose parents were incapable of contracting
marriage at the time of conception, unless the parents should later marry. Id. art. 204.
This acknowledgment is distinguished from legitimation which may be accomplished
in two ways - by the subsequent marriage of the child's parents or by a notarial act
by either parent before two witnesses, acknowledging the child and expressing the
intent to legitimate such child. Id. arts. 198, 200.
3. 406 U.S. at 165.
4. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1231 (1950) provides in pertinent part:
For injury causing death within two years after the accident there shall be paid to
the legal dependent of the employee, actually and wholly dependent upon his
earnings for support at the time of the accident and death, a weekly sum as hereinafter provided for a period of 400 weeks ....
5. 406 U.S. at 167.
6. Id. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1232 (1950) sets forth the payment schedule of
workmen's compensation benefits to dependents. It provides for benefits distributed in
the following sequence:
Payment to dependents shall be computed and divided among them on the following basis:
(6) If three or more children, sixty-five per centum of wages.
(8) If there are neither widow, widower, nor child, nor dependent parent
entitled to compensation, then to one brother or sister, thirty-two and one-half
per centum of wages with eleven per centum additional for each brother or sister
in excess of one. If other dependents than those enumerated, thirty-two and one-
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awarded judgment only to the extent that maximum compensation benefits
were not exhausted by the four legitimate children. 7 As the tort suit
settlement had exceeded and thereby exhausted those benefits, the two
illegitimate children received nothing.
Both the Louisiana Court of Appeals8 and a divided Louisiana Supreme
Court 9 sustained the relevant statute, which relegated unacknowledged
illegitimates to the inferior classification of "other dependents,"' 1 notwithstanding the constitutional objections based upon the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment." On writ of certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Louisiana's denial of equal
recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged illegitimates was based upon
an arbitrary classification and was thereby violative of the equal protection
clause since there existed no rational basis upon which the classification,
between that group and legitimate or acknowledged illegitimate children,
could be justified. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972).
Notwithstanding the well-established common law and statutory tradition of extensive discrimination against illegitimates, 12 the Supreme Court
half per centum of wages for one, and eleven per centum additional for each such

dependent in excess of one, subject to a maximum of sixty-five per centum of
wages for all, regardless of the number of dependents.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. Under Louisiana law unacknowledged illegitimates are relegated to the inferior classification of "other dependents" under LA. REv. STAT. § 23:1232(8) (1950).
See note 6 supra. See also Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22
So. 2d 842 (1944).
8. It should be noted that this court did not actually consider the equal protection argument on its merits, but rather held only that Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968), (see notes 14-20 and accompanying text infra), could not be given retrospective application. Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 232 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 1969).
9. Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 257 La. 424, 242 So. 2d 567 (1971).
10. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
11. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Under the common law a child born out of wedlock was considered to be
nullius filius. This child of "no one" could not inherit nor could he have heirs other
than those of his body. Robbins, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate
Children: A Comparative Study, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 308, 316 (1930). See Note,
Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 45 (1959); Annot., 24 A.L.R. 570 (1935). His
parents had neither a right of custody of the child nor a duty to support him.
Robbins, supra, at 316. Furthermore, any subsequent act by the child's parents,
including marriage, would not suffice to remove the stigma of illegitimacy. Id. at 318.
The rationale underlying this harsh treatment stemmed primarily from a
moral tradition which stressed the sanctity of marriage and condemned illicit relationships. Early monogamous societies treated the illegitimate more harshly than did
polygamous societies due to a stronger, more strictly enforced marital tie in the
monogamous society. Id. at 309-10. See Krause, Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate,
65 MicH. L. REv. 477, 498-99 (1969). Moreover, the majority of American courts
initially adhered to the common law treatment of illegitimates. See Note, supra,
at 47. States have, however, mitigated this hardship through statutory enactments
which narrowed the definition of illegitimacy, provided means of subsequent legitimation, or established a legal presumption of the legitimacy of any child born in
wedlock, even though conception may have resulted from an adulterous relationship.
See Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society - A Proposed Uniform
Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 829, 843-44 (1966).
. Nevertheless, extensive discrimination continues to exist in various areas. In
the area of the child's right to an inheritance, for example, statutes in nearly all states
place the illegitimate on an equal footing with the legitimate child regarding its ability
to inherit from its mother, but the illegitimate generally cannot inherit from his
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did not consider the constitutionality of such discrimination in light of
the equal protection clause until 1968, when it rendered two decisions
holding Louisiana's wrongful death statute violative of the equal protection
clause. 13 In the first decision, Levy v. Louisiana,14 five illegitimate children
brought suit pursuant to Louisiana's wrongful death act and sought recovery as "surviving children" for damages resulting from the loss of their
mother and for damages based on the survival of the cause of action which
had vested in the mother at the time of her death for pain and suffering. 15
Recovery had been denied by the Louisiana Court of Appeals on the
basis that "surviving children" under the statute did not include illegitimate
children.' 8 The state court indicated that the denial of recovery was justified
in order to discourage bearing of children out of wedlock.' 7 On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of the
exclusion in terms of the equal protection clause. 18
father. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 478
(1969). See Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates, Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DICK. L. REv. 377, 377-78 (1971) ; Note, supra, at 74-84. In
the area of custody, the father of an illegitimate generally fares worse in his right to
custody of his illegitimate child than the father of a legitimate child. Gray & Rudovsky,
The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 34-38 (1969). Lastly,
the illegitimate frequently fares worse under state and federal welfare laws. For an
analysis of statutory treatments of illegitimates, see id. at 27-29. See also Krause,
Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477, 480-82 (1969) ; Note,
The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1962).
13. Glona v. American Guar. Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Glona, a mother sought damages for the death of
her illegitimate son pursuant to the Louisiana wrongful death act. LA. CiV. CODE ANN.
art. 2315 (West 1971). She had been denied recovery under Louisiana law which
excluded mothers of illegitimate children from the classification of "surviving mothers,"
thereby precluding her from recovering for the wrongful death of her illegitimate
child. See Lynch v. Knoop, 118 La. 611, 43 So. 252 (1907). Applying the rational
basis test (see note 18 infra) to the statutory classification, the Court found no
justification for distinguishing mothers of legitimate children from mothers of illegitimate children. 391 U.S. at 76.
14. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
15. Id. at 69-70.
16. Levy v. Louisiana, 192 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 25,
193 So. 2d 530 (1967).
17. Id. at 195.
18. Where a statutory classification is challenged because it violates the equal
protection clause, the Court will effectively apply a twofold inquiry:
What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental
personal rights might the classification endanger?
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
If there is no fundamental right involved, the Court will apply the traditional
rational basis test, which it has formulated as follows:
[A state classification] must always rest upon some difference which bears a
reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is
proposed, and can never be made arbitrary and without such basis.
Gulf, C.&S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1896).
If, however, the statutory classification is found to interfere with sensitive
and fundamental personal rights, the Court will exercise a stricter or closer scrutiny.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). The effect of this exercise of closer scrutiny
is to negate the traditional presumption of constitutionality attending the classification,
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969), and it becomes incumbent upon the state to show that the classification meets the standard of the
rational basis test and, additionally, that the classification is necessary to promote
some compelling state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
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The Supreme Court in Levy did not find fault with the validity of the
state's interest in providing a right of recovery for losses sustained due
to the wrongful death of a parent, but rather questioned the existence of
any rational relationship between this legitimate purpose and the different
treatment with respect to legitimate and illegitimate children. In making
this determination, it would seem that the Court closely scrutinized the
classification in Levy, as it indicated the fundamental right involved there
to be the child's right to the intimate familial relationship with his mother. 19
The Court concluded:
Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of
the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, though
illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured
them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual
sense; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any de20
pendent would.
The import of Levy was somewhat emasculated, however, when in a
five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court, in Labine v. Vincent,21 upheld
Louisiana's statutory scheme of intestate succession, favoring legitimate
children over acknowleged illegitimate children who could inherit only
when the only other claimant under the intestacy provisions was the state.22
The Court distinguished the Levy decision, 23 characterizing it as merely
standing for the proposition that:
[T]he State could not totally exclude from the class of potential
plaintiffs illegitimate children who were unquestionably injured by
the tort that took their mother's life. Levy did not say and cannot
fairly be read to say that a State can never treat an illegitimate child
differently from legitimate offspring. 24
Moreover, the Court indicated further distinctions. First, Levy involved
a tort, whereas Labine did not. Secondly, whereas both the legitimate
children in Levy were wronged in the same manner by the wrongful death
Therefore, fulfilling the traditional rational basis test alone does not suffice when a
fundamental right is involved; yet, failure to meet that test is sufficient to invalidate
the classification.
It should be noted that the above analysis outlines the traditional formulation.
However, the Court itself frequently speaks broadly in terms of general equal protection principles rather than mechanically applying any test. See Green v. Waterford
Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 72-1676 (2d Cir., Jan. 29, 1973) (suggesting a narrowing of
the gap between the two constitutional standards, and citing Weber). Furthermore,
although the Court has alluded to fundamental rights, it has never precisely defined
a fundamental right. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., supra, at 179 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). For cases referring to fundamental rights, see Levy v. Louisiana, 381
U.S. 68 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra; Brown v. -Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 535 (1942). See also Developments in the Law - Equal Protection.
82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
19. 391 U.S. at 71. See notes 18 supra & 26 infra.
20. 391 U.S. at 72.
21. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
22. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1952).
23. See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra.
24. 401 U.S. at 535-36 (emphasis added).
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of their parent, the intestacy succession statute in Labine did not deal with
an individual being wronged, but was simply an attempt by the state to
25
regulate the disposition of the intestate's property.
This distinction would seem to be relevant for purposes of determining
the constitutionality of the classification under the equal protection clause.
The wrong in Levy involved a fundamental right which led the Court to
scrutinize closely the classification. The alleged absence of such a fundamental right 26 in Labine would seemingly lead the Court to apply the
less stringent rational basis test under the equal protection clause. Yet, the
Labine Court chose rather to deemphasize the rational basis test by merely
referring to it in a footnote, indicating that the result would be the same
even if the rational basis test had been applied.2 7 Apparently, the regulatory
aspect of the intestacy succession statute led the Court to defer to the
state's power to control the disposition of property within its borders
upon an intestate's death. It is difficult to understand, however, why the
Court did not directly apply the rational basis test to the challenged
classification, especially in light of its opinion that the result would have
been the same.

28

25. Id. at 535, 537.
26. See note 18 supra. The absence of a fundamental right must be inferred from
the absence of any reference thereto in the decision. One possible justification for the
differing results of Levy and Labine depends upon the vague characterization of the
fundamental right in Levy. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. It is argu-

able that interference with the child's fundamental right to an intimate familial relationship with its mother arises in Levy as a result of the commission of the tort and
that the statute's express purpose is to remedy the violation of that right. Justice
Douglas intimated the existence of such interference in Levy:
When a child's claim of damage for loss of his mother is in issue, why, in terms
of "equal protection," should the tortfeasors go free merely because the child
is illegitimate?
391 U.S. at 71. As this is arguably the interference with which the statutory classification dealt, closer scrutiny was applied to insure that all those children suffering
such an interference are afforded equal recovery rights. However, in Labine, it can
be argued there was no interference with the parent-child relationship as the intestacy
statute only took effect after the termination of the relationship and was in no way
concerned with the creation or protection of rights arising as a result of the interference with that intimate familial relationship. Thus, it can be argued that there
was no interference with this fundamental right, and the statute need meet only the
traditional rational basis test.
Yet, it is also possible that the statutory discrimination itself in Levy constituted the interference with the child's fundamental right in that it denied equal
recovery rights to those children who were similarly situated having an intimate
familial relationship. It could be argued, therefore, that a similar statutory interference existed in Labine since the state had effectively denied equal inheritance rights
to those children who were similarly situated in an intimate familial relationship
with a parent.
27. 401 U.S. at 536 n.6, wherein the Court stated:
Even if we were to apply the "rational basis" test to the Louisiana intestate
succession statute, that statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's
interest in promoting family life and of directing the disposition of property left
within the State.
28. This failure to apply the rational basis test was a focal point for the dissent
in Labine:
But no one questions Louisiana's power to pass inheritance laws. Surely the
Court cannot be saying that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
is inapplicable to subjects reguable [sic] by the States - that extraordinary
proposition would reverse a century of constitutional adjudication under the Equal
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The Labine Court found another distinction from Levy, namely, the
absence of any state-created insurmountable barrier to that child's capacity
to inherit. Under the wrongful death statute in Levy, the State had
supposedly created an insurmountable barrier to the illegimate's ability
to recover compensation. 29 However, in Labine the Court found no insurmountable barrier to the child's ability to inherit for, under the Louisiana
statutory scheme regulating inheritance, a father may devise one-third of
his estate to his acknowledged illegitimate child. 30 It is submitted, however,
that this distinction is tenuous at best. The supposed statutory barrier
to recovery that was present in Levy could actually be considered surmountable; the mother could have legitimated her children, 31 thereby vesting
32
them with rights equivalent to those children who were born legitimate.
In the wake of Labine, the continued viability of Levy was uncertain.
For example, several federal courts,3 3 recognizing that Labine circumscribed
Levy, chose to follow the Labine rationale in upholding discriminatory
4
provisions of the Social Security Act.
It was in this climate of uncertainty that the Louisiana court in Weber,
when confronted with the question of the validity of the inferior classification of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates under the workmen's compensation law, upheld the discrimination, distinguishing the case from
Levy.3 5 The primary basis for the lower court's distinction was that Levy
Protection and Due Process Clause. It is precisely state action which is subjected
by the Fourteenth Amendment to its restraints.
Id. at 548-49. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 539.
30. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1486 (West 1952).

31. Although mere acknowledgment of children alone is not sufficient to permit
recovery in Louisiana, legitimation of children qualifies them under Louisiana's

wrongful death act. See Youchican v. Texas & P. Ry., 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551
(1920) ("children" refers only to children born in wedlock or duly legitimated);
Levy v. Louisiana, 192 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 1966) (mere acknowledgment not sufficient to allow recovery). See also note 2 supra.
32. Furthermore, for equal protection purposes, the thrust of Labine would
seem to be, not whether there was an absence of any insurmountable barrier to the
child's ability to inherit, but whether there was any rational basis for subordinating
the claim of acknowledged illegitimates under the intestacy succession statute. The
Court has, in other instances, struck down discrimination merely disadvantaging a
class. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963).

33. In Parker v. HEW, 453 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1972), the court sustained the

challenged classification as not violative of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. See note 34 infra. Referring to the impact of Labine, the court stated

that "[a]ny doubt in regard to the legislature's power to distribute rights on the
basis of status stemming from legitimate or illegitimate birth was resolved by the
Supreme Court in [Labine]." Id. at 852. Thus, the court concluded:
[T]he statute in question may be justified on the basis of Congress giving
precedence or priority to the legitimate children in the interest of strengthening
and preserving family ties ....
Id. at 851. See Watts v. Veneman, 334 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1971); Garner v.
Richardson, 333 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1971). But see notes 71-75 and accompanying text infra.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 416(h) (3) (C) (1970). These sections provide for the
reduction of benefits to qualified illegitimate children before any reduction in benefits
to others when the total monthly claims by qualified survivors of the deceased insured
exceed the maximum monthly family grant allowable.
35. Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 257 La. 424, 242 So. 2d 567 (1971).
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involved a wrongful death statute which absolutely excluded all illegitimates
from recovery, whereas the workmen's compensation statute at issue in
Weber placed acknowledged illegitimates on a parity with legitimate
children. 36 Moreover, the latter statute did not deny recovery to unacknowledged illegitimates but rather merely placed them in the inferior recovery
classification of "other dependents. ' 37 Such a distinction appeared justifiable
given the Labine Court's interpretation of Levy as prohibiting only total
exclusion of illegitimates and its apparent deemphasis of the rational
basis test.38
The Supreme Court, however, rejected these arguments in the instant
case and invalidated the classification as violative of the equal protection
requirement. In so doing, it relied on three rationales: (1) the state
interest in promoting legitimate family relationships is not served by intrafamilial discrimination since it cannot seriously be contended that a mere
statutory disability will significantly discourage illicit sexual relationships ;39
(2) the state interest in promoting legitimate family relationships has no
significant relation to, but rather is in direct conflict with, the recognized
primary purposes of workmen's compensation statutes and, therefore, such
a statute is not the proper vehicle through which to pursue this collateral
governmental objective;4° and (3) the basic concept of our system of
justice that legal burdens should bear some relationship to the individual's
responsibility or wrongdoing makes it unjust to penalize a child for the
circumstances of his birth, over which he had no control. 41
Applying the rational basis test, the Weber Court concluded that the
discriminatory classification of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates bore
no rational relationship to the state's purpose of providing recovery for
losses sustained by dependent children resulting from the death of their
father. 42 The Court indicated that the state could not justify the classification on the basis of its collateral legitimate interest in protecting the family
unit and promoting legitimate family relationships. 43 It cannot "be thought
here that persons will shun illicit relations because the offspring may not
one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation." 44 Further, it
emphasized:
We do not question the importance of that interest [promotion of
legitimate family relationships] ; what we do question is how the
challenged statute will promote it.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 431, 242 So. 2d at 570.
Id. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
See notes 21--28 and accompanying text supra.
406 U.S. at 173.

40. Id. at 173-75. It should be noted that this rationale is implied, rather than

specifically stated, throughout the opinion.
41. Id. at 175.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 173. One statistical study has indicated that the rate of illegitimacy
has steadily increased in spite of the state's attempted deterrance of illicit relations.

See H.

CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS

156 (1968).
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The state interest in legitimate family relationships is not served
by the statute. . . . Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the illegitimate is an ineffectual . . . way of deterring
the parent.4 5
46
Consequently, lacking a legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise,
the Court concluded that there was no justification for such unequal

treatment.
The second rationale of the Court is implied throughout the opinion.
The Court, reasoning that Levy was controlling, stated:
An unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much from the
loss of a parent as a child born in wedlock or an illegitimate later
47
acknowledged.
The Court recognized the fact that the primary purpose of the workmen's
compensation statute was to compensate those children dependent on the
deceased who suffer as a result of his death, regardless of the status of
their birth. Since such need and suffering do not distinguish between
legitimates and illegitimates, there was no rational relationship between
the primary purpose of the statute and the discriminatory classification. 48
However, the Court had indicated in Labine that the collateral interest
of promoting the family relationship could be rationally served by the inferior position of the acknowledged illegitimate in the state's intestate
succession statute despite its totally unrelated primary purpose.49 The
obvious problem then is to ascertain the significant difference that justifies
the conclusion that this collateral interest is properly pursued by means of
discriminatory treatment of illegitimates under intestate succession laws,
and yet improperly pursued by means of discriminatory compensation
schemes in workmen's compensation and wrongful death acts. One
arguable difference may be the relationship of the collateral state interest
with the primary underlying purposes of the respective statutes. Since
both wrongful death and workmen's compensation statutes are designed
to create a recovery right for close relatives and dependents of the deceased,
the collateral purpose of promoting legitimate family relationships is
directly antagonistic to this primary objective. 50 In other words, the state
cannot seek to create a right of recovery for any child who has suffered
loss due to the death of a parent and concurrently pursue a policy of
promoting legitimate family relationships by denying equal recovery rights
to a few children who are similarly situated, except for the status of their
birth - a factor totally irrelevant to the gravity of their loss. In Labine,
however, there was, at least arguably, no conflict between the primary
statutory purpose - to regulate the intestate disposition of property within
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

406 U.S. at 173-75.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 175.
See note 27 supra.
See Gray & Rudovsky, smpra note 12, at 8.
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the state's borders and thereby to provide for stability of land titles and
prompt determination of the valid ownership of the property5 - and the
state's interest in promoting legitimate family relationships. Since the
primary purpose is essentially regulatory in nature and does not seek to
protect or benefit dependent children generally, no direct conflict is created
by also employing the statute as a vehicle to pursue the aforementioned
collateral interest.
The third equal protection rationale utilized by the Court arose from
the basic juridical concept that "legal burden should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. '5 2 It was, in the Court's
53
opinion, highly unjust to visit "condemnation on the head of an infant"
for conduct over which he had no control - for a wrong in which he had
no part.5 4 Such harsh treatment of the innocent can only be justified in
the face of a compelling governmental interest.5 5 Thus, even if the
discriminatory classification could comply with the two aforementioned
equal protection rationales by demonstrating some rational basis, it would
nevertheless fail this third, absent a showing of a sufficiently crucial or
compelling state objective to justify or excuse the significant interference
with the child's fundamental personal rights. 6
The interrelationship of the three equal protection rationales of Weber
is exemplified by the Court's invalidation of the discrimination between
acknowledged and unacknowledged illegitimates. 57 As previously mentioned, the Weber Court's decision was based in part on the simple observation that discrimination against illegitimate offspring will never discourage
individuals from engaging in illicit relationships. Thus, even if such a
goal is a proper governmental objective, utilizing this method of discrimination for achieving this goal is unjustifiable.5 s However, this reasoning is not as persuasive if applied to discrimination against unacknowledged
illegitimates where the governmental goal is to encourage parental acknowl51. 406 U.S. at 170.

52. Id. at 175. It was precisely this rationale to which the dissent in Labine
(see note 28 supra) alluded when it stated:
The Court nowhere mentions the central reality of this case: Louisiana
punishes illegitimate children for the misdeeds of their parents.
401 U.S. at 557 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

53. 406 U.S. at 175.

54. Id. at 176.
55. Id. at 175-76. While the Court does not explicitly come to this conclusion, it
is nevertheless reasonably inferable from the thrust and tone of the decision.
56. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, specifically addressed himself to this argument:
A fair minded man might regard it [the classification] as both [illogical and
unjust], but the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
neither ....
It requires only that there be some conceivable set of facts which
may justify the classification involved.
Id. at 183. Thus, he rejected the Levy rationale and indicated his preference for a
single constitutional test to examine all statutory classifications. He rejected the
Court's dual approach as a "judicial superstructure," allowing the Court to expand
traditional equal protection principles in order to make policy judgments on legislative enactments. Id. at 183-85.
57. This discrimination should be contrasted to the broader discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children invalidated in Levy. See notes 14-20 and
accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra.
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edgment of their offspring. It is not unreasonable to maintain that acknowledgment can be effectively encouraged by means of statutory incentives
and discriminations. It would not be a futile attempt to prevent illicit
sexual conduct, but rather an attempt to achieve formal parental acceptance of the child in conformity with certain statutorily prescribed
procedures.
This proffered justification, however, was evidently not argued, and
the Court did not address itself to it sua sponte. However, even this
justification fails to satisfy the third rationale employed by the Court to
strike down the classification. That rationale, 59 a basic legal maxim, condemns discrimination between the acknowledged and the unacknowledged
illegitimate with as much force as it condemns discrimination between the
legitimate and the illegitimate.60
Furthermore, even if the Court had concluded that the workmen's
compensation scheme was a proper vehicle to advance the state interest
in the acknowledgment of illegitimate children, the facts in Weber would
require the same result, since the claimants were unacknowledgeable illegitimates due to the marital incapacity of their parents at the time of conception."' The Court could have chosen to indicate that the impossibility of
acknowledgment was the fatal flaw in the Louisiana scheme; that is, the
state could advance its interest in the acknowledgment of children, but in
doing so it could not preclude a parent from acknowledging this child if
such preclusion would result in a denial of recovery under the workmen's
compensation act. This argument, in fact, is the focal point of Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion, wherein he indicated that he would so
limit Weber.6 2 By refusing to adopt such a limited holding, the Court
has further indicated that a state cannot encourage parental acknowledgment to the point of precluding recovery by a dependent child who suffered
loss, anymore than it can preclude such recovery in order to discourage
illicit relationships.68
This analysis may satisfactorily explain the import, if any, of the
Court's reference to the existence of a state-created insurmountable barrier
to acknowledgment of children in a Weber situation.6 4 The Court referred
to this barrier in its attempt to distinguish Weber from Labine wherein
the Court had considered the absence of a state-created insurmountable
59. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
60. Additionally, it could be argued that such a justification fails in light of the
second rationale. Although there is a legitimate state objective, it may be argued that
this statute is simply not a proper vehicle for its pursuit in light of the obvious conflict between this collateral objective and the primary objective of creating a right
of recovery.
61. See note 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra.
62. 406 U.S. at 176-77. Justice Blackmun read the majority opinion as granting
dependent unackrowledged illegitimates full equality with dependent legitimate
children. Having concluded the bar to acknowledgment was the fatal flaw under the
statute, he indicated he would let the resolution of this broader issue await presentation
in a more appropriate factual context. Id. at 177.
63. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra.
64. 406 U.S. at 170-71.
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barrier a relevant factor in deciding the case. 65 Thus, it could be argued,
as Justice Blackmun suggested, 6 that had there been no insurmountable
barrier, the discrimination would have been tolerated in that this broad
interpretation of Labine would control. Granted that there is a valid
factual distinction, nevertheless, it is not important to the application of
equal protection principles in Weber, for the thrust of the decision is that a
child should not be penalized for something over which he had no control legitimacy and acknowledgment. From this basic premise, it follows that
the mere fact that a parent could or could not have legitimized or acknowl67
edged the child cannot operate to deny the child his remedial right.
The fact that the Weber Court failed to confront adequately the Labine
decision presents difficulties with respect to Labine's future application.
Weber has apparently restricted Labine since the Court merely has stated
that Labine represented its traditional deference to the state's authority
to regulate the disposition of a decedent's property within its borders.68
Yet, this is an unsatisfactory resolution of the apparent conflict between
the decisions. It fails to explain adequately, in terms of the equal protection
clause, the constitutional justification for the inferior classification of
acknowledged illegitimates in intestate succession. It is elementary that
such deference cannot justify the avoidance of a constitutional mandate.6 9
Nevertheless, it seems clear that Labine will be limited to similar statutes
involving the regulation of property, and that its rationale cannot be
extended to statutes designed to provide compensation to children when
the primary purpose of such statutes is to protect or benefit dependent
offspring. 70
A further difficulty with the Weber decision concerns the extent to
which a state may employ acknowledgment and legitimation requirements
in any statute to promote legitimate family relationships and to encourage
the parental recognition of their illegitimate children. It is apparent from
the Court's reluctance to overrule Labine that states may still promote
these interests by discriminating against illegitimates - acknowledged and
unacknowledged - in their intestate succession statutes. But, it would
appear that states may, in the future, be required to abandon acknowledgment and legitimacy requirements in other areas to advance their interest
in promoting socially acceptable family relationships, and to adopt more
direct methods, such as providing economic inducements, to encourage
parents to acknowledge and legitimate their illegitimate offspring, methods
which would involve no discriminatory interference with basic rights.
65. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
66. See note 62 supra.

67. Accordingly, it would seem that this distinction does not afford the Court a
basis for justifying the different results of Weber and Labine. Perhaps in recognition
of this, the Court mentioned it only secondarily to the major distinction between
the differing underlying purposes of the statutes. 406 U.S. at 170-71.

68. Id. at 170.

69. But see notes 21-28 and accompanying text supra.
70. Compare note 33 supra (pre-Weber cases) with notes 71-75 and accompany-

ing text infra (post-Weber cases).
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In conclusion, the Weber decision has made several significant contributions to the meager body of constitutional precedent protecting the
illegitimate: (1) it has reaffirmed Levy's application of the rational basis
test and the need for stricter scrutiny in this area, a judicial advance which
had been endangered by Labine; (2) it has rejected a restrictive interpretation of the Levy holding - only total exclusion of illegitimates from the
statutory recovery scheme is prohibited - and has declared that equal
protection encompasses all children of the same natural parents, regardless
of the legitimacy of their births - that is, inferior inclusion will not
suffice; (3) it has suggested three different equal protection rationales to
weigh discrimination among such children; and (4) it has condemned
discrimination between unacknowledged and acknowledged illegitimates
with constitutional force equal to its condemnation of discrimination against
all illegitimates.
However, the Weber Court's reluctance to overrule Labine leaves
unresolved the question with respect to the precise application of each
decision to statutes concerning the illegitimate child. The early results of
Weber indicate that uncertainty does, in fact, persist. For example, in
Morris v. Richardson,71 Weber was followed by a three-judge federal court
72
in striking down discriminatory provisions of the Social Security Act.
The Weber rationale seems clearly applicable, and earlier federal decisions
relying on Labine in upholding these same discriminatory provisions are
now of questionable viability. However, in New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization v. Cahill,73 a three-judge court held that the state's interest
in preserving and strengthening traditional family life justified public
assistance eligibility standards, requiring that both parents live at home,
be ceremonially married to each other, and be the natural or adoptive
parents of children living at home. The court recognized Weber as controlling since the eligibility requirements operated as a hardship on illegitimate children, and applying the Weber rationales, the court subjected the
eligibility classification to close scrutiny.7 4 It concluded, however, that it
was a sufficiently proper and compelling interest for the state to refuse
to subsidize a family unit which violated its laws against fornication and
adultery, and that there existed a rational relationship between this legiti75
mate purpose and the statutory scheme for eligibility.
While it is still uncertain how pervasive Weber will be in removing
discrimination against the illegitimate child, its sweeping philosophical condemnation indicates that the trend should be toward its eventual eradication.
E. R. Harding
71. 346 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Ga. 1972), judgment vacated, 409 U.S -.....
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 416(h) (3) (C). See note 34 supra.
.
(D.N.J. 1972).
73 -...... F. Supp.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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